Abstract. A new model for the description of phenomena of social aggregation is presented. On the basis of psychological concepts (social norms, cultural coordinates, and so on), we conceive a mechanism in which different clusters of individuals can merge according to the cooperation among the agents. In their turn, the agents can cooperate or defect according to the clusters distribution inside the system. In general, the fitness of an individual increases with the size of its cluster, but decreases with the work the individual had to do in order to join it. We see how the cooperation is the most convenient strategy only in presence of very large clusters, while on the other hand it is not necessary to have one hundred percent of cooperators for reaching a totally ordered configuration with only one megacluster filling the whole system.
Introduction
The study of the evolution of social systems is today a topic which attracts the interest of researchers from different domains such as physics, psychology, mathematics. In fact, an interdisciplinary approach provides a more powerful way to understand and modelize such complex systems [1] . One important issue within this field is the understanding of the phenomena of social aggregation, as for instance urbanization, cultural clusterization, imitatitive processes in econophysics and so on.
The classical approach of sociophysics is statistical-mechanical: the system under analysis is considered in a thermodynamical way, that is the system is seen as composed by a great number of identical elementary units and, starting from the rules governing the microscopical dynamics of individuals, the general behaviour at macroscopical level is achieved. Consequently, this methodology is very useful in those systems whose peculiarity is produced by statistical laws rather than by specific microscopic details [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] .
On the other hand, a different kind of research is represented by the analysis of cooperative behaviours, in particular the study of the emergence of cooperation in systems of generic agents [8, 9, 10] , in financial markets [11] or in academic networks [12] . The main theoretical scaffolding to face such issues is mutuated from game theory, largely used in econophysics, which focuses on the evolution of the strategies that agents use during their interactions [13, 14] .
Psychological background
Social norms, beliefs, attitudes and opinions are also concepts which have attracted the interest of researchers from a great number of different fields [15, 16, 17, 18] . For sure it is quite hard to define explicitly those objects, but reaching a reliable representation of them is a required step in order to implement models for social dynamics. Psychology and sociology are useful tools to provide definitions for concepts like previous ones, but the real challenge is to produce operational definitions instead of "simple" domain-based descriptions. Social fragmentation can be viewed also as the result of the process called "social meaning negotiation", that is defined as the interaction of two individuals who do not share the same lexicon or meanings [19] .
Sharing the same beliefs, norms, attitudes and opinions means to use the same cultural coordinates to communicate, enhancing the process of meaning negotiation and increasing the probability to converge to the same "social cluster". On the other hand, norms, attitudes, beliefs and opinions are objects intrinsically linked together and there is a natural resistance to change cultural coordinates because it is possible to see them as the product of well-established neural circuits and because frequently a change would cause a cascade effect on the others. Moreover, importing a psychological representation of cultural coordinates (CC) means at least to highlight three main characteristics:
• CC are hard to change.
• People who have the same CC belong to the same cultural cluster.
• The degree of cultural separation among agents, that is how much their social norms are different, can be defined as a "distance" on the basis of their reciprocal cultural coordinates.
The last crucial ingredient of the social meaning negotiation process is the role of the environment on the negotiation strategies. Indeed, from a sociological point of view, it is well-known that belonging to a big cultural cluster (i.e. sharing the same CC with a great amount of people) increases the individual fitness [20] . Consequently the macroscopic features of a population influence the probability to change its own CC to increase the size of the group.
Finally, the main role of social sciences in this challenge is to link in an ecological way the microscopic dynamics (i.e. the evolution strategy of individual) with the macroscopic phenomenology (i.e. the state of the whole system).
Structure of the paper
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define our model in general, while in section 3 we study a first simple version of it on the basis of pure game theory. In section 4 we present a step forward of the analysis of section 3, also by means of numerical simulations, in order to understand the dynamical properties of the model. Finally, in the last section we will discuss more our results and some perspectives for future works will be outlined.
The Model
The goal of this paper is to conceive a model of social aggregation by unifying the thermodynamical approach with the game-theoretical one. More precisely, we want to write down a model whose microscopical dynamics is defined starting from the payoff matrix of each agent. In other words, the interaction between two individuals is determined (also) by their payoff matrix, and in their turn the payoff matrices of the individuals evolve according with the dynamics.
Let us define our model. We consider a system of N agents where every agent belongs to a cluster. Each cluster represents a group of individuals who share the same cultural coordinates. From a psychological point of view we start considering two main assumptions. First, we assume that an agent tends to mantain his CC. At the same time every agent has an advantage to belong to a group as bigger as possible. On the basis of such considerations we can state that the fitness of an individual increases with the number of other individuals sharing its same social norms, i.e. with the size of its cluster. On the other hand, the fitness decreases according to an "economic criterion", that is according to the work the individual accomplished in order to merge with its actual group. In practice, when a player i meets an opponent j from a stranger cluster, its payoff matrix iŝ
where C means "cooperation" (availability to join the opponent's group), N "no cooperation" (or "defection"), m i is the population of the cluster of the player i, m j the population of the opponent's cluster, and d ij is the distance (in the CC space) between the two clusters: following what we stated above, this distance is seen as the work an individual has to do in order to join a new group. The meaning of Eq. (1) is then clear: when two cooperators meet, they put in common their CC, and this is equivalent to the merging of their groups into one (a strong assumption, which we will discuss in section 5). Moreover, we assume that they "meet in the middle", so that the work spent is half of the original distance between them. If the opponent does not cooperate, the first player has to cover the entire distance d ij to gain the CC of the opponent's cluster, and besides he will lose contact with its original goup. On the contrary, if the first player does not cooperate (but the opponent does) it will not spend anything but gain to its group only the presence of the second player (i.e. the size, and then the fitness, of first player's cluster increases of one unit). Finally, if nobody cooperates, nothing will happen. Of course, it is meant that only players from different clusters can meet, or equivalently, that when two players from the same group meet, nothing happens. It must be noticed that in this picture, while the size of the clusters is naturally a discrete variable, distance is defined as a continuous one.
Static Homogeneous Model
As a first step of our study, we start considering a rather strong approximation of the model defined in the previous section, which we call "static homogeneous model" (SHM): we assume that the system is always perfectly homogeneous, so that all the players obey to the same payoff matrix. Then, we will analyse the dynamics of such population by means of the replicator method [21] , i.e. we will just investigate only on the evolution of the density of cooperators as if the dynamics of the clusters inside the system were frozen. In particular, in order to make the agents have all the same payoff matrix, we assume that every cluster has size m, and is at a distance 2x = d ij from each other, being d ij the averaged distance among all the clusters. So, the payoff matrixÂ of Eq.
(1) becomesÂ
For what we have just stated,Â H is the payoff matrix of every player (we suppose again that only players from different clusters can interact). Now it is also reasonable to think that x ≥ 1 (presumably the work needed to reach another cluster is at least not smaller than the fitness represented by one individual), so that we do not lose generality assuming 2x ≫ 1, and finally we set ε = m − x − 1. In this way we reduce to study a population in which the payoff matrix of individuals iŝ
where ε, as we are going to see, is the crucial parameter of the SHM. Of course it is always x > 0. Notice that this approximation will be even more valid as the averaged size and distance of clusters increase. Now, said p(t) the density of cooperators at the time t, its behaviour is given by replicator equation [21, 22] 
where f C is the averaged payoff of a cooperator and Â H the averaged payoff of a generic player. Being the payoff matrix the one given by Eq. (3), the previous replicator equation becomes dp dt
with
Of course, the density of non-cooperators will be given by the obvious condition p + q = 1 ∀t.
3.0.1. Nash equilibria The Nash equilibria of Eq. (5) are in general the roots of the polynomial at right side:
In order to understand the phenomenology, it is important to find also the stability of the equilibria given in Eq. (7). The explicit evaluation of the stability is left in Appendix, here we just give the results obtained.
CASE ε < 0 -This condition is equivalent to m < x+1: the distance among clusters is so high that the work needed to merge with another group is always greater than the maximum gain possible in case of cooperation. Thus, in this case the Nash equilibrium p E 1 = 0 is the only one which is stable: p E 2 = 1 is unstabile and p E 3 is unphysical, since ω > 1. Notice that for ε ∈ (−1, 0)Â H defines just a Prisoner's Dilemma.
CASE ε > 0 -In this case all the three equilibria given in Eq. (7) are physical. More precisely, pure equilibria p E 1 and p E 2 are stable, while the mixed equilirium p E 3 is unstable. Because now it is m > x + 1, the gain in fitness in case of mutual cooperation is bigger than the loss due to the distance, so that the stable equilibrium p E 2 is perfectly understandable. The fact that the equilibrium p E 1 is stable also in this case could be a little bit surprising, but a deeper analysis of the situation gives back a more intuitive picture: the basin of attraction of equlibrium p E 2 increases for ε (and then m) increasing, while at the same time the basin of p E 1 decreases, disappearing in the limit ε → +∞. In this sense, we could state that for great values of ε the equilibrium p E 2 is somehow "more stable" than p E 1 , and viceversa for small values of ε. More precisely, the basin of attraction of p E 2 becomes bigger than the basin of p E 1 (that is, the all-cooperators equilibrium becomes "more stable" than the no-cooperators one), when it is m > 2x+ 1. A phase diagram of the SHC is given in Figure 1 . For ε > 0 the continous lines at p E = 0 and p E = 1 represent the (pure) stable Nash equilibria, the dotted line represents the (mixed) unstable Nash equilibrium p E = ω = 2x/(2x + ε). For ε → 0 + the unstable equilibrium collapses on p E = 1, while for ε → +∞ it collapses on p E = 0: in this limit only the all-cooperators configuration is stable. For ε < 0 p E 1 remains stable, whilst p E 2 is unstable: there is actually a bifurcation in (p E , ε) = (1, 0).
Despite its roughness, this simple analysis allows us to draw some preliminar conclusions about the main features of the model. In particular, it seems to be clear that cooperation is an advantageous strategy only when the size of the clusters is much bigger than their averaged distance. In the next section we will deepen our investigation by means of the dynamical homogeneous model.
Dynamical Homogeneous Model
The strongest assumption of SHM is to disregard the evolution of the clusters, focusing only on the concentration of cooperators (and defectors) in the population. In order to shed light on the entire behaviour of the system, we are now going to introduce the "dynamical homogeneous model" (DHM).
DHM is implemented as follows. At t = 0 we divide a system of N individuals into clusters each one of size m 0 , so that we have initially N/m 0 clusters of the same size (we always set N as a multiple of m 0 ). Every generic cluster i is identified by a natural variable g i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N m 0 }: then, the distance between two agents belonging to the clusters j and k respectively will be d jk = |g j − g k | (notice that with such definition the distance is a discrete variable too). Moreover, each agent has a default strategy (cooperative or not cooperative), picked up randomly, so that the initial density of cooperators is ̺ 0 . The dynamics works in this way: at each elementary step two different agents, i and j, are drawn. If they belong to the same cluster, nothing happens. Otherwise, they "play the game" according to the payoff matrix (1) and their actual strategy: if both players cooperate, their clusters merge (the smallest is absorbed by the biggest one); if one player defects, the cooperator leaves his cluster and joins the opponent's one; if nobody cooperates nothing happens. After the game, a player computes what it would have gained if it had adopted the other strategy (remaining fixed the strategy of the oppenent). If such virtual payoff is greater than the real one, the player will change its strategy at the next interaction. Time is measured in montecarlo steps, so that on average every agent interacts once per time unit. We accomplished all our simulations with ̺ 0 = 1/2 and for several values of m 0 and N. In Figure 2 we report the typical behaviour of the DHM for a particular choice of the parameters (N = 3024, m 0 = 4). This figure well summarizes the phenomenology of our model. We can clearly distinguish three different dynamical regimes: at early times we have Regime I, that we also call "exponential decay regime" for reasons we will soon explain, then we find a steady-state regime or Regime II, and finally we have Regime III, in which the system rapidly reaches a frozen state: we are going to study them separately in the following subsections.
Before analysing in details the three dynamical regimes, it is convenient to write down the equations ruling the evolution of the main quantities which characterize the state of the system. Regarding the cooperators density, which will be here indicated by ̺(t), starting from the payoff matrixÂ written in Eq. 1, it is easy to see that its time evolution must be ruled by the equation
where i is an agent randomly extracted, j another agent randomly extracted not belonging to the same cluster of i, m i the size of the cluster of i, β ij the probability that m j − d ij /2 is smaller than one, α ij the probability that the quantity m j − m i + 1 − d ij is smaller than zero. Finally, the symbol · i,j means of course the average over every possible couple i, j (with i and j belonging to different clusters). Analogously, the time evolution of the averaged size of the survived clusters, m(t), will be given by
Exponential decay regime
At the very early stages of the dynamics, we can assume that the payoff matrix of each agent is theÂ H given in Eq. (2), with m = m 0 ≃ m i ∀i and the real distance d ij instead of the averaged one 2x. In such case we have β ij = β and α ij = 1 ∀i, j: in the limit N ≫ m i (we will treat the case of m 0 equal to a finite fraction of N in subsection 4.4) equations (8) and (9) becomė
whose solutions are, respectively
and
Now, said d = d ij i,j , in this regime it is β = Pr(m 0 −d/2 < 1), and this probability depends in general on m 0 and N. Anyway, it is straightforward to understand that β(m 0 = 1) = 1 ∀N, and that lim N →+∞ β(m 0 ) = 1 ∀m 0 . On the basis of these considerations, we expect an exponential decay of ̺(t) at early stages of dynamics, with coefficient β equal to one for m 0 = 1, and tending to one for increasing values of the size N of the entire system if m 0 > 1. This fact is fully confirmed by Figures 3 and  4 . Regarding the averaged size of survived clusters, we see from Eq. (13) that, while it remains valid, m(t) is bigger than m 0 and smaller than the quantity
so that m(t) is practically constant during this regime: a proof of the last statement is given already in Figure 2 , where it is clear how m(t) is a quasi-constant in the initial stages of the dynamics. It must be noticed that, because for every survived cluster k it must be m k > 0, and we are dealing with small values of m 0 , this means that the clusters distribution inside the system remains almost unchanged (see also Figure 6 ).
The exponential decay regime will last until the cooperators density is not too small: we expect actually that it should end when ̺ becomes of the order of N −1 . From Eq. (12) we gain
For the case depicted in Figure 3 (β = 1, ̺ 0 = 0.5, N = 10000), previous relation gives t * ≈ 8.5, in good agreement with the numerical data. For values of m 0 greater than 1, the evaluation of t * directly from Eq. (14) is more delicate because in this case also the quantity β depends in its turn on N, and moreover there are bigger fluctuations in the system (when two cooperators meet their groups merge, and this causes bigger fluctuations in clusters distribution as m increases); however the relation t * ∝ log(N) is valid ∀m 0 , as we will see in subsection 4.2. Therefore, for N → +∞ this regime never ends: ̺(t) → 0 and, from Eq. (13), we find m(t) = m 0 = const. Then, in the thermodynamical limit (when m 0 ≪ N for every finite m 0 ) we have back the same result of the SHM, where the unique (stable) Nash equilibrium is the complete absence of cooperators. On the other hand, this is coherent with the fact that, if we set the system ab initio with ̺ 0 = 0, nothing will ever happen.
Steady state
Once, for finite values of N, the cooperators density became very small and the system left the Regime I, the equation (10) is not valid anymore. Indeed, in this case almost every interaction will be between two defectors, so that equation (8) becomeṡ
where we took into accounts that from Eq. (13) the clusters distribution is practically the initial one, and then we assumed again N ≫ m i and α ij = α ∀i, j. But, as we have just said, the clusters density is still almost equal to the initial one, so that it must be also α = Pr(1 − d < 0) ≃ 1, from whicḣ In Figure 5 we can see this behaviour for the case N = 3024 and m 0 = 2; in Figure  6 we show instead how clusters distribution appears at the beginning of steady state regime.
As we can easily see, ̺(t) is actually almost constant, just sligthly increasing because of small fluctuations in the clusters distribution which make α not perfectly equal to one, but a very little bit smaller. On the other hand, m(t) keeps on behaving as in the exponential decay regime. This can be seen by inserting Eq. (16) into (11), obtaininġ
where we exploited again the fact that m(t) barely changes during the Regime I. Now, while the quantity m 0 ̺ 2 ss t remains much smaller than N, also m(t) remains very close to m 0 (see Figures 2 and 5) . However, once the relation m 0 ̺ 2 ss t ≪ N ceases to be true, the system exits from the steady state regime, beacause at this point m(t) ≫ m 0 and the clusters distribution is now quite different from the initial one: so, also the quantities α ij in Eq. (8) become considerably smaller than 1 and this changes dramatically the shape of ̺(t) too, as shown in Figure 2 .
Before starting the analysis of the subsequent regime, it is worth to take a look to the behaviour of ̺ ss as a function of N and m 0 . For m 0 = 1, from Eq. (14) it has to be necessarily ̺ 0 e −βt * ≡ ̺ ss ∼ 1 N The same behaviour is found for higher m 0 , as one can see in Figure 7 , so that we can conclude stating the relation
Of course, last equation, together with (14), demonstrates also that the time t * for leaving the Regime I is proportional to log(N) for every value of m 0 . 
Frozen state
It is straightforward to understand that the steady state cannot last forever. Indeed, according to Eq. (17), the survived clusters' averaged size should diverge after a timet given byt
Now, it is obviously impossible that m → +∞, since of course m(t) < N. In fact, as we are going to see soon, the dynamics freezes well before this timet. In Figure 8 we report the behaviour of the freezing time for a couple of values of m 0 , from which it is possible to see that the freezing time t F follows actually a power-law on N, but with exponent δ ≈ 0.8 instead of 3. Now, we wonder what kind of frozen state is actually reached by the system. Let us consider the general equation (9) ruling over the evolution of m(t). Assuming the sizes of survived clusters as indipendent from each other at every time, so that we can write
By integrating last relation, it is found
being K a suitable (positive) constant. Doing the limit t → +∞, and said ̺ F the cooperators density in the frozen state, to the previous relation, it is clear that there are only two possible frozen configurations:
• (A) -If we have ̺ F = 0 (no cooperators in the final state), then it must necessarily be m F < N, that is the frozen state is disordered.
• (B) -If instead we have ̺ F > 0 (finite fraction of cooperators in the final state), then the integral at right side diverges, so that it must be m F = N, thus the frozen state is ordered (i.e. only one survived cluster remains in the system).
The configuration (A) is completely lacking in cooperators, so, in order to be frozen, the difference in size between two clusters wathever must be always less than their distance minus 1: in the opposite case, as one can see from the payoff matrix (1), there would be players who could become cooperators after an interaction. On the other hand, the configuration (B) is pretty easy to understand, since when the entire system is occupied by just one cluster, dynamics stops by definition. Now, in the steady state regime, the cooperators density is so small that it is possible to get a fluctuation pushing the system in the disordered frozen state, with no cooperators and many clusters in it. If instead such a fluctuation does not happen, the normal dynamics given by equations (8) and (9), or even more simply by (20) , will drive the system into the ordered frozen state, with a finite density of cooperators, and one mega-cluster occupying the whole system. For these reasons we expect that the probability of the system to end in the disordered frozen configuration increases with ̺ ss decreasing, i.e. with N increasing and m 0 decreasing. Actually, for m 0 = 1 and after 1000 iterations, we observed the system ending in the ordered state only three times for N = 100, just once for N = 200, and never for higher N. On the other hand for m 0 ≥ 4, we did not ever observe the system falling in the disordered configuration, since in this case ̺ ss becomes small enough only at very high N, when the freezing time is too big to be observed. Finally, the ratio between the number of times in which the frozen state is ordered over the number in which it is ordered drops from 0.86 for N = 200 to 0.1 for N = 2000 in the case m 0 = 2, and it is still 0.95 for N = 3024 when m 0 = 3.
An interesting aspect of the ordered configuration is that the density of cooperators is in this case finite but less than one: so, even though the disordered frozen state is just the Nash equilibrium p E 1 = 0 of the SHM (see section 3), the ordered one is not the perfect counterpart of the analogous in SHM. That can be explained because when the system is very close to the completely ordered state, the agents belonging to the biggest cluster have no interest in cooperation, so that most of them will be defectors. This is shown in Figures 2 and 9 where it is easy to see how the abundance of cooperators in the frozen ordered state is always well smaller than 1/2 (remaining around 1/3). On the other hand, this is not a real Nash equilibrium, since it does not exist in the thermodynamical limit.
Limit of very large initial clusters
Until now we have dealt with small values of the initial clusters size m 0 : more precisely, so far we have exploited the thermodynamical limit supposing fixed m 0 as N increases. Now, one could wonder what happens to the system if we set instead m 0 = zN (with 0 < z < 1) before doing the limit N → +∞. Indeed, in the SHM, a transition between the phase with the unique stable Nash equilibrium p E 1 and the phase with two stable equilibria (in particular the new one p E 2 ) takes place for m = x + 1, being x the half averaged distance among all clusters. An analogous transition in DHM somehow happens, but in a rather trivial way: indeed, when m 0 diverges (even remaining much smaller than N), a single interaction between two cooperators will create a new cluster very much bigger than the others, thus the system will reach the ordered state soon, typically after much less than 10 time units.
Conclusions and Perspectives
In this paper we have presented a model for the social aggregation of human communities. Main feature of this model is the interplay between the inclination of every individual to cooperate with others in order to live in groups as bigger as possible, and an opposite attitude, driving the agents to stay where they are since joining a new group involves a work accomplished by the agent itself. This work, needed by an individual when it associates to a stranger cluster, is interpreted as a "distance" in the abstract space of cultural coordinates: the more two groups have different CC, the more they are far away from each other in this space, the more is the work an individual must spend to go from one cluster to the other. The result of such interplay is that cooperation is the most suitable strategy only in presence of very big clusters, so that the gain in fitness of the individuals who join these big groups is greater than the distance they had to cover to reach their new "accomodation". More precisely, using the language of game theory, we found that cooperation is a stable Nash equilibrium, with a basin of attraction bigger than the one of defection, when the averaged size of clusters is bigger than the averaged distance among them.
This model is of course a tough simplification of the real world, and contains some unsatisfactory features: in particular, the property of the clusters to merge when two cooperators of them meet is quite strong, and also the definition of distance between clusters appears to be somehow arbitrary. Improving the model in these aspects can be the goal of future reaserches. Anyway, despite such problems, our results are qualitatively realistic for some important social phenomena which involve human societies. Indeed, our results suggest that in an area occupied by a great deal of small communities, distributed more or less uniformly, nobody has interest to move from home to another community, since there is no real difference among the communities, and a displacement would mean only a work to accomplish without any gain in fitness. However, when some of these communities, beacause of a changement in the external conditions, or for a simple fluctuation, become quite big with respect to the other ones, they assume the role of centers of attraction, destinations of the immigration of people from anywhere, so that these centers reach soon the typical size of a metropolis. This aggregation mechanism seems actually to be what really happened during several urbanization phenomena through history, as for instance the "urban explosion" in the basin of the Mediterranean Sea around sixth Century BC, or also in Western Europe during the Industrial Revolution. It is worth to notice that in this picture the merging of two groups when only two cooperators interact is not so unrealistic, since presumably an immigrant will call and invite to the big city his former fellow citizens. Moreover, in many cases this same dynamics is apparently at work when religions, political parties or other kinds of social aggregations grow up inside a society. Finally, it is worth also to mention the result that, as we saw in subsection 4.3, it is not really necessary that every individual has to cooperate in order to merge different clusters into one: on the contrary, the fraction of cooperators can be less than 0.5 also in systems made up of only one big cultural cluster. Of course, deeper studies and further interpretations are needed, but the fact that our oversimplified model, with all its assumptions, gives already reasonable results is very encouraging for the future.
